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ABSTRACT 
Tlie efficacy of new policing techniques has called in to question a long held canon of 
criminologists: that vast social forces (such as poverty, racism and demographics) beyond 
police control are the primary determinants of criminal activity. A new approach to policing 
called COMSTAT (computerized analysis of crime statistics) has resulted in a significant re­
duction in criminal activity within the cities that have adopted it according to FBI Uniform 
Crime Report data. These results were achieved by quickly identifying and targeting minor 
social disorders crimes (such as graffiti, loitering, and vandalism) before they lead to major 
social disorders (such as robberies, rapes, and homicides). This paper discusses the informa­
tion and management theory underlying the COMSTAT approach to policing. 
INTRODUCTION 
For decades, criminologists have argued that tlie key predictors of criminal activity are vast 
social forces (such as poverty, racism and demographics) beyond police control (Pederson, 1996 
& 1997). The crime reduction results of a new approach to policing called COMSTAT (comput­
erized analysis of crime statistics) seems to refute this basic tenet of criminologists. COMSTAT 
does not argue that social forces do not have the potential ti impact crime rates. Rather, COMSTAT 
suggests that proactive policing, based on solid information analysis and the resultant policing 
strategies, can reduce the impact of these societal artifacts. 
Advanced analytical techniques (such as pattern matching and identification) that empower 
management to make more informed decisions form the theoretical foundation of the COMSTAT 
process. The COMSTAT process seeks to reduce criminal activity and by extension to enhance a 
community's quality of life. 
An advanced computer-based decision support system to aid decision making provides the 
technological infrastructure of the COMSTAT approach. This technological foundation is used 
to facilitate more modem decision-makmg techniques based on (near) real time information within 
the day-to-day activities of a police organization. More specifically, the technological and deci­
sion making techniques permit constant monitoring of policing practices, which facilitates con­
tinuous improvements in police productivity. Early results indicate that the COMSTAT approach 
has merit. 
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For 1997, the two early adopters (New Orleans, LA and Newark, NJ) of the COMSTAT 
process were number one and two in the nation in terms of violent crime reduction for cities with 
populations over 250,000. These results provide strong evidence that the COMSTAT process 
may be able to significantly improve the efficacy of policing with respect to reducing crime. 
The paper proceeds as follows. First, the COMSTAT methodology is explained in detail. 
Then, the COMSTAT's crime reduction efficacy with respect to early adopters is discussed. 
Finally, conclusions with respect to the COMSTAT process are provided and discussed. 
THE COMSTAT METHODOLOGY 
COMSTAT combines statistical analysis and management accountability to transform po­
licing practices. COMSTAT facilitates the rapid retrieval and analysis of crime data and drives 
accountability and decision-making authority to the lowest appropriate level within a police orga­
nization. COMSTAT utilizes a four-step policing process to reduce crime (Brady, 1997b): 
• Accurate and timely intelligence 
• Rapid deployment that is concentrated, synchronized and focused 
• Effective tactics 
• Relentless follow-up and assessment. 
Accurate and Timely Intelligence 
Accurate and timely intelligence requires that statistical analyses are done on a daily basis. 
This permits police to anticipate crime rather than react to it. On a daily basis, the COMSTAT 
software identifies and updates crime patterns. This allows police personnel to target areas expe­
riencing criminal activity more quickly than in the past. More specifically, COMSTAT better 
operationalizes the characteristics of valuable information (Stair & Reynolds, 1999, p. 7) with 
respect to policing: 
• Accurate 
• Complete 
• Flexible 
• Relevant 
• Simple 
• Timely 
• Verifiable 
• Accessible 
• Secure. 
The COMSTAT system utilizes a state-of-the-art approach to data collection (i.e., accu­
rate, complete, and verifiable), which results in data analysis being much closer to real time (i.e., 
timely). System security is facilitated by a rigorous log-in protocol. The COMSTAT software 
permits flexible data analysis by making slicing and dicing the data a simple task. COMSTAT 
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synthesizes complex data about specific criminal cases into crime maps and summary statistics 
that highlight emerging criminal patterns. These crime maps and other COMSTAT statistical 
tools are accessed by the precinct commanders to develop the day's policing strategies (i.e., 
accessible and relevant). 
At its core, COMSTAT's computer mapping process and statistical software are used to 
identify emerging and systemic patterns of criminal activity. Other recent research lends credence 
to the proposition that criminal activity may adhere to identifiable patterns and that socioeco­
nomic policy can impact these patterns. 
For example, researchers analyzing every American death certificate over a number of 
years found that death rates spiked up at the beginning of the month. This spike held steady 
month after month and year after year. From a health perspective, substance abuse was identified 
as a primary contributing factor for the rise in death rates. Fiscally speaking, the researchers 
attributed the jump in mortality to government support payments, such as welfare or disability, 
which arrive at the beginning of the month. The research found that 106.5 homicides occurred 
during the first week of a month for every 100 homicides that occurred during the last week of the 
preceding month. For deaths involving substance abuse and an external cause (such as suicides, 
accidents, and homicides), there were 114.2 such deaths in the first week of the month for every 
100 deaths in the last week of the preceding month (Phillips, et al., 1999). 
From a societal and longer-term perspective, COMSTAT's greatest contribution may be its 
criminal pattern identification processes leading to additional systemic patterns of criminal activ­
ity being identified and to a better understanding of lite root causes of such systemic patterns such 
that police and other organizations can act on them. From a policing perspective, COMSTAT 
could help police develop tactics and strategies to counter the systemic socioeconomic artifacts 
that contribute to criminal activity. Additionally, COMSTAT can assist police in developing 
strategies and tactics dealing with community specific societal artifacts such as street gangs, the 
closing of a large employer, etc. 
Rapid Deployment That Is Concentrated, Synchronized and Focused 
Block-by-block crime is generated by COMSTAT. This data allows police commanders to 
pinpoint areas experiencing high levels of criminal activity. The commanders then saturate the 
crime hot zones with police personnel. The objective being to extinguish the criminal activity 
before it has a chance to grow and spread to other neighborhoods (Pederson, 1997). For example, 
a pattern of daytime burglaries in three adjoining neighborhoods was identified by the COMSTAT 
crime mapping software. Patrol officers and detectives blanketed the neighborhoods with a police 
presence and were able to rapidly respond to a burg lary in progress. This strategy lead to a quick 
response to a crime report. The ensuing investigation eventually led to the arrests of nine people 
in connection with 35 burglaries. The investigation also resulted in the seizure of 10 guns and the 
recovery of $50,000 in stolen goods (Perlstein & Elrandon, 1997). 
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Effective Tactics 
Effective tactics require identifying and understanding which policing strategies to use to 
reduce criminal activity and, by extension, to enhance a community's quality of life. The broken 
window theory of policing provides a theoretical foundation for many of COMSTAT's tactical 
policing strategies. The broken window theory argues that a zero-tolerance approach no nuisance 
crimes (such as graffiti, loitering, and vandalism) will enhance a community's quality-of-life. 
Essentially, the broken window theory argues that nuisance crimes should be targeted relent­
lessly, because they create an environment that fosters more serious crimes. The underlying con­
cept is that minor social disorders breed major social disorders (Wilson & Kelling, 1982; Kelling 
& Coles, 1996). 
More generally, the broken window theory argues that a broken window is a sign of com­
munity neglect and (if left untreated) leads to more serious social decay. Thus, the police, other 
municipal departments, and the community at large should work in concert to see that abandoned 
cars, garbage piles, graffiti, etc., are eradicated as soon as possible to prevent further more 
serious erosion with respect to the community's quality of life (Wilson & Kelling, 1982; Kelling 
& Coles, 1996). Additional support for the broken window theory can be found in recent research 
with respect to burglary. 
Burglary has long been considered a relatively innocuous low-priority non-violent crime. 
However, recent research (sing Florida court records) indicates that burglary often predates more 
serious crimes. The research showed that murderers and rapists were more likely to have begun 
as burglars than as any other type of criminal. Further, DNA analysis and DNA databases are 
increasingly identifying known burglars as suspects in murders and rapes. Collecting DNA samples 
from murders and rapists has become common practice. Additionally, fourteen states now also 
collect DNA samples from convicted burglars. For some states, over 50% or more of the crimes 
cleared using DNA databases have been connected to burglars. For example, Virginia and Florida 
have been using DNA databases to help solve unsolved crimes since the early 1990s. Burglars 
have accounted for 60% of the crimes solved with DNA analysis in Virginia. In Florida, the 
figure is about 50% (Willing, 1998a & 1998b). The results provide strong evidence of the broken 
window theory's vahdity—reducing a lesser crime (burglary) will potentially lead to a reduction in 
more serious crimes (murder and rapes). 
Another key tactic of the COMSTAT approach requires that detectives should interview 
everybody who gets arrested because that leads to more arrests and by extension lessens future 
crime. The key theme is that being proactive today can reduce crime tomorrow (Brady, 1997b). 
Relentless Follow-up and Assessment 
Relentless follow-up and assessment dictates that weekly meetings are held between the top 
management of the police department and the precinct commanders (as a group). During these 
meetings, the precinct commanders are questioned in detail about crime and crime fighting strat­
egies in their precincts. The follow-up and assessment process is facilitated by the computerized 
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crime maps. The exact location of every crime is mapped. Also, response times and arrest rates 
are logged and studied (Brady, 1997b; Perlstein & Brandon. 1997). The maps and other statistics 
highlight very clearly which strategies and tactics are working and not working. 
At the weekly meetings, precinct commanders are held accountable for reducing cnme in 
their precinct and are expected to have detailed knowledge about the criminal activity and inves­
tigations in their precincts. Further, they are expected to continuously reduce cnminal activity, 
they do not come prepared with detailed knowledge or fail to reduce crime, they are replaced. 
Precinct commanders, in turn, hold the personnel under them (e.g., officers and detectives) ac­
countable for solving crimes and reducing crime rates. To facilitate information flow and ac­
countability, precinct commanders hold mini-COMiSTAT meetings with their platoon command­
ers and detectives (Brady, 1997b; Perlstein & Brandon, 1997). The key is that more precise 
measurements of each individual's and each precinct's productivity are now available and con­
stantly monitored for improvement. 
The identification of crime patterns that cross precinct boundaries is also facilitated by the 
weekly meetings between top management and the precinct commanders. For example, a study of 
robberies at the weekly COMSTAT meetings revealed that cars used in robberies in one precinct 
were being abandoned in another precinct. Patrol officers were stationed at strategic points be­
tween the precincts. This resulted in a quick response to a robbery and the arrest of five suspects 
who were ultimately charged with several more armed robberies and two shootings (Perlstein & 
Brandon, 1997). 
COMSTAT RESULTS: THE EARLY ADOPTERS 
The crime statistics referred to in this section are based on the FBI's Uniform Crime Report 
data. Criteria for compiling the Uniform Crime Report data are specified by the FBI. The cities 
compile the data. Then, the FBI collects the data from the cities and uses the data to generate 
crime statistics. 
In 1995, the New York Police Department (NYPD) first implemented many of the prin­
ciples that evratually became the COMSTAT process of policing (Brady, 1997a). Crime in New 
York declined by 36% and murders fell by 51% from 1994 (the year prior to implementation) to 
1997 During this period, the nation as a whole reported a 3.6% decline in crime. From 1994 to 
1996^ the public approval rating for the NYPD rose from 36% to 72% {Crime Reduction Ser­
vices, 1999). New York now has crime statistics comparable to cities like Boise, Idaho and is now 
safer than 75% of the nation's largest cities (Perlstein, 1997). 
During 1997 (see Table I), the first full year after the launch of the COMSTAT process in 
New Orleans, violent crime was down 2.4%. Non-violent crime declined 13% and overall crime 
fell 15%. In the city's French Quarter, violent crime was down 35%. According to Uniform 
Crime Report data for 1997, New Orleans reported the sharpest drop in violent crime for U. S. 
cities with populations over 250,000. During 1998 (see Table 2), violent crime declined another 
18% and non-violent crime fell another 9%. Overall crime was down nearly 11%. 
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Table 1. New Orleans Uniform Crime Report 1996 vs. 1997 
Offense 1996 1997 % Change 
Murder 350 266 -24.00% 
Rape 390 385 -1.28% 
Armed Robbery 4,509 2,999 -33.49% 
Simple Robbery 1,191 973 -18.30% 
Assault 4,675 3,821 -18.27% 
Violent Crime Total 11,115 8,444 -24.03% 
Burglary 9,954 8,107 -18.56% 
Theft 22,774 19,813 -13.00% 
Auto Theft 10,169 9,380 -7.76% 
Non-Violent Crime Total 42,897 37,300 •13.05% 
TOTAL CRIMES INDEX 54,012 45,744 -15.31% 
Table 2. New Orleans Uniform Crime Report 1997 vs. 1998 
Offense 1997 1998 % Change 
Murder 266 230 -13.53% 
Rape 385 299 -22.34% 
Armed Robbery 2,999 2,195 -26.81% 
Simple Robbery 973 770 -20.86% 
Assault 3,821 3,394 -11.18% 
Violent Crime Total 8,444 6,888 -18.43% 
Burglary 8,107 7,008 -13.56% 
Theft 19,813 18,645 -5.90% 
Auto Theft 9,380 8,270 -11.83% 
Non-Violent Crime Total 37,300 33,923 -9.05% 
TOTAL CRIMES INDEX 45,744 40,811 -10.78% 
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In early 1997, the Newark (NJ) Police Department implemented the COMSTAT process. 
For 1997, Newark reported the second largest drop in violent crime for U. S. cities with popula­
tions over 250,000. Table 3 summarizes 1996 (the last non-COMSTAT year) and 1998 crime 
statistics for Newark. Over the two-year COMSTAT p<;riod, Newark reduced both violent (35.65%) 
and non-violent crime (31.94%) in excess of 30%. 
The fact that COMSTAT's two earliest adopters. New Orleans and Newark, had the highest 
reductions in violent crime among the nation's 60 largest cities (i.e., populations over 250.000) 
for 1997 provides strong evidence of COMSTAT's efficacy with respect to reducing crime. 
Table 3. Newark (NJ) Uniform Cirime Report 1996 vs. 1998 
Offense 1996 1998 % Chanee 
Murder 92 60 -34.78% 
Rape 179 162 -9.50% 
Robbery 4,219 2,846 -32.54% 
Assault 4,271 2,569 -39.85% 
Violent Crime Total 8,761 5,637 -35.65%) 
Burglary 5,991 3,481 -41.90% 
Theft 11,694 9,987 -23.14% 
Auto Theft 7,992 5,000 
Non-Violent Crime Total 25,677 17,468 -31.94%) 
TOTAL CRIMES INDEX 34,438 23,105 -32.91%) 
CONCLUSIONS 
Criminologists have postulated for decades that crime rates are a function of vast social 
forces (such as poverty, racism, and demographics) beyond police control (Pederson 1996 & 
1997). COMSTAT's early results, in New Orleans and Newark, seem to call into question this 
basic tenet of criminologists who have argued that police tactics have a minimal effect on crime. 
The argument is not that social forces do not have the potential to impact crime rates. Rather, the 
argument is that proactive policing, based on solid information analysis and the resultant policing 
strategies, can lessen the effect of these societal artiifacts. 
Replication of COMSTAT's initial success in additional cities is required before it can be 
conclusively argued that COMSTAT's policing strategies can have a significant impact with 
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respect to reducing crime rates. Additionally, to prove its long-term worth as a superior approach 
to current policing practices, COMSTAT will need to continue to reduce crime for many con­
secutive years within the communities that have adopted it. Assuming the COMSTAT policing 
process becomes more widely adopted, longitudinal research should be conducted across a larger 
number of cities to better determine COMSTAT's long-term efficacy with respect to reducing 
crime rates and improving a community's quality of life. 
REFERENCES 
Brady, E. (1997a, December 1). A crime consultant with an arresting style. USA Today, 17A-
18 A. 
Brady, E. (1997b, December 1). COMSTAT: Mapping, accountability equal less crime. USA 
Today, 18 A. 
Crime reduction services. (1999). New York: The Linder/Maple Group. 
Kelling, G. L. & Coles, C.M. (1996). Fixing broken windows: Restoring order and reducing 
crime in our communities. New York: Free Press. 
Pederson, D. (1996, December 23). Bullets in the big easy. Newsweek, 29. 
Pederson, D. (1997, October 20). Go get the scumbags. Newsweek, 32. 
Perlstein, M. (1996, October 6). N. O. police to adopt big apply focus, tactics. The Times-
Picayune, Al, A6. 
Perlstein, M. (1997, April 21). Remaking the NOPD: Bite of the apple. The Times-Picayune, Al, 
A7-A8. 
Perlstein, M. & Brandon, A. (1997, April 20). Revolution. The Times-Picayune, Al, A16-17. 
Phillips, D. P., Christenfeld, N., & Ryan, N. M. (1999, July 8). An increase in the number of 
deaths in the United States in the first week of the month ~ An association with sub­
stance abuse and other causes of death. The New England Journal of Medicine, 341(2), 
93-98. 
Stair, R. M. & Reynolds, G. W. (1999). Principles of information systems, 4th Ed. Cambridge, 
MA: Course Technology-ITP. 
Willing, R. (1998a, December 12). DNA links burglars to harder crimes. USA Today, lA. 
Willing, R. (1998b, December 12). States adding burglars to DNA databases. USA today, 3A. 
Wilson, J. Q. & Kelling, G. L. (1982, March). Broken windows: The police and neighborhood 
safety. The Atlantic Monthly, 249(3), 29-38. 
66 
8
Journal of International Information Management, Vol. 9 [2000], Iss. 1, Art. 6
http://scholarworks.lib.csusb.edu/jiim/vol9/iss1/6
